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Western legal systems typically provide legal protection in the form of 
a constitutional right that specifically protects religious freedom.  For 
example, Article 10 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.1 
Similarly, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”2 
The First Amendment right to religious freedom might be thought to be
special in the sense that it provides protections for religious worldviews that
are not provided for non-religious worldviews by the constitutional rights
to speech, belief, conscience, association, and other relevant liberty rights.3 
Insofar as religious worldviews also receive the protections that non­
religious worldviews receive from the aforementioned rights, a distinct right
that protects only religion would be duplicative, if not superfluous, if it
does not provide some additional protections not provided to non-religious 
worldviews.  This does not mean that there could be no legitimate rationale 
for expressly protecting religious worldviews with a right to religious freedom
that provides no additional protection to religious worldviews than to non­
religious worldviews; there might be many reasons for doing so.  But the 
1.  2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. 
2. 	 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
 3. 	See id.
218
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justification for a special right to religion would have to be that religious 
worldviews implicate different interests than non-religious worldviews 
that are not adequately protected by those rights that protect all worldviews. 
If the First Amendment right to religious freedom is a special right, 
then it would have to protect religion, as a matter of political morality,
for different reasons from those justifying legal protection of speech,
conscience, thought, association, and other activities of social, political,
and moral significance.
In this Article, I will argue that a special right to religious freedom is 
not morally warranted, and that hence such a right illicitly discriminates 
against non-religious worldviews.  The principal argument here is that
there is no adequate reason to think that religious worldviews implicate
any interests distinct from those implicated by non-religious worldviews. 
While it is certainly true that religious worldviews warrant, as a matter of 
political morality, all the protections that non-religious worldviews receive,
there is good reason to question what seems to have become a dogma 
among Western nations—namely, that religious worldviews deserve special 
protection.
Even so, the argument of this Article should be considered just a prima 
facie case against a special right to religious freedom.  The argument rests
on identifying distinct interests implicated only by various religious 
worldviews. Although I consider a number of possible interests we have 
in religious, but not non-religious, worldviews, it is simply not possible in 
an article of this scope to identify all the various candidates for religious 
interests that might figure into a successful justification for protecting
religious freedom with a special right.  Nevertheless, the argument considers
a sufficient number of potential candidates for such an interest as to constitute
a prima facie case against protecting religious freedom with a special
right that requires rebuttal.4 
4. One might respond by arguing, on democratic grounds, that it could be legitimate to
protect religious worldviews with a special right.  On this line of argument, if a majority
of people votes to afford religious worldviews protection by a special right, then such
protection is morally legitimate.  I am indebted to Andrew Koppelman for this line of 
objection. See Andrew Koppelman, Nonexistent and Irreplaceable, COMMONWEAL (Mar.
27, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/nonexistent-irreplaceable 
[https://perma.cc/G65E-4TF8].  There are two problems with this line of objection. First, 
it incorrectly presupposes that anything a majority might decide to do through the law is 
morally legitimate; the history of slavery in the U.S. is a decisive counterexample to that 
presupposition—if one is really needed.  The theory of legitimacy that best coheres with 
our constitutional democracy is one that posits moral limits on what a majority can
 219


















   
   
 
     
  
 
    
  
 
   
     
 
 
   
    




It bears emphasizing here that the thesis should not be construed to deny 
that religious worldviews should be protected by constitutional rights. 
The thesis, rather, is only that religious worldviews should not be afforded 
protection denied to non-religious worldviews.  On my view, a constitution,
other things being equal, should treat religious worldviews no differently
from non-religious worldviews in terms of the liberty rights that protect 
pursuit and expression of non-religious worldviews.  Accordingly, I argue 
that the law should afford equal protection, to the extent that this is possible, 
to both religious and non-religious worldviews.5 
I. THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS A SPECIAL RIGHT
Moral and legal rights are conceptually distinct but typically related, as 
a contingent empirical matter, in legal practice.6  Moral rights protect 
interests that are sufficiently valuable from the standpoint of morality to 
warrant moral constraints on the behaviors of others.  In contrast, legal 
rights typically, though not always, protect interests thought by judges or 
legislatures to be sufficiently valuable, from a moral point of view, to
society to warrant recognition and enforcement by law.7  Although legal 
and moral rights are conceptually distinct, the issue of whether an interest
is protected by a moral right is always relevant in deciding whether that 
interest should, as a matter of political morality, be protected by a legal 
right. Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, whether the law should protect
an interest will depend, to some extent, on the moral importance of that 
interest;8 while there might be some exceptions, the assessment of an 
do through democracy through the mechanisms of constitutional rights.  Second, assuming
the objection is otherwise unproblematic, the thesis of this Article can be construed to
claim that it is irrational to afford special protection to religious worldviews. 
5. There might be practical elements associated with religious worldviews that are 
lacking entirely in non-religious worldviews that require protection.  This would not be a 
special protection in the sense explained above, as the additional protection is not needed
for non-religious worldviews since they lack the relevant practical elements.  I am skeptical of
such a claim, but this is not an issue that can be explored here in any detail.
6. See, e.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Final Authority To Bind with Moral Mistakes: 
On the Explanatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism, 24 LAW & PHIL. 1, 9, 12, 29,
45 (2005).
7. This is not to deny that some legislators or judges might be motivated by non-
moral and prudential considerations in deciding what content the law should have;
however, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the positions officials support are justified by
their views, at least in part, by considerations of political morality.  Indeed, Supreme Court 
Justices characteristically frame their disagreements in moral language referring to their 
theories of what is morally legitimate for the Court to do. See, e.g., id.
8. Although it might be true that every moral right should be protected by a legal 
right, the mere importance of an interest does not necessarily entail that the interest should
be protected by some kind of legal right; however, that is one of the most important
considerations. One could argue that there are many important interests that should not be 
220
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interest’s importance in considering whether law should protect it will 
take into account its moral significance. 
The articulation of a specific constitutional right to religious freedom
suggests that it is distinct from the other rights enumerated alongside it 
and hence that it is special in the sense that it provides protections to
religious worldviews and associated practices that are not provided to non­
religious worldviews and associated practices.9  Each of the constitutional
provisions quoted above lists a number of other rights in addition to the right 
to religious freedom.10  The separate enumeration of rights suggests that
each of these rights is separate from the others in virtue of some distinctive
feature that warrants some distinct or special protection that cannot be 
derived from those other rights.
Nevertheless, the distinct articulation of a right in a constitution does
not imply it is special in character.  Which rights are separately articulated
in a constitution depends on the contingent motives and intentions of those 
who articulate, ratify, and interpret the relevant rights.  These motivations 
could require articulating a separate right even though it might be that all 
of the protections of that right can logically be derived from other rights. 
One reason for this might be that the fact that one protection can logically
be derived from another protection does not, by itself, entail that the courts 
make the proper deductions or derivations in interpreting the right. If the 
courts fail to enforce the derived protections and thereby fail to provide 
adequate protection for the relevant interests, then other relevant officials
can step in and rectify that failure by proposing an amendment to the
constitution that defines a distinct and express protection of what would 
otherwise be—or, ideally, should be—merely a derived right.  The right 
would be enumerated and named in the constitution despite the fact that
all the protections could, if the courts interpreted the other relevant rights 
properly, be derived from those other rights. 
protected by a legal right, such as the interest we have in food or water.  Although I believe
that every affluent society should use the law to ensure that everyone has adequate food 
and water, the point is sufficiently contentious that I want to acknowledge, while 
remaining agnostic on the issue, that more might be needed.  One possibility, of course, is 
that there might be competing interests of greater importance. Fortunately, the argument
of this Article does not depend on identifying competing interests of agnostics or atheists; 
for this reason, the point does not really apply here.  I am indebted to Andrew Koppelman
for calling my attention to this potential concern. See Koppelman, supra note 4.
 9. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
 10. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. 
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Although this is one possible justification for articulating a distinct 
constitutional right to religious freedom, it is probably not the operative 
justification for the articulated rights to religious freedom stated in the 
European and U.S. Constitutions.  There are a number of ways to see this. 
Consider, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis
of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.11  Title VII can arguably
be viewed as a statutory extension of interests antecedently protected by
the U.S. Constitution to include private employers, as well as public employers. 
For example, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibits public discrimination on the basis of such “immutable
characteristics” as sex, race, color, and national origin.12  Similarly, the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would prohibit public discrimination
on the basis of religious views.13 
There are two particularly salient features of Title VII: (1) what protections
it provides religious worldviews; and (2) what protections it provides non­
religious worldviews. As to (1), Title VII requires employers to attempt
to accommodate religious worldviews; it provides that employers have a
legal duty to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective 
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer’s business.”14  As to (2), Title VII does not require
employers to attempt to accommodate non-religious worldviews.15  Because
the relevant views will usually be moral in character, Title VII, in essence,
protects moral views that are derived from religious worldviews but not 
moral views that are secular in character.16  Accordingly, Title VII, following 
and extending existing constitutional protections, treats moral views conditioned
by religion more favorably than it treats moral views not conditioned by 
religion. 
Insofar as the Constitution and federal statutory law treat religious
worldviews more favorably than non-religious worldviews, these laws 
discriminate against non-religious worldviews.  Care should be taken here. 
To say that the law “discriminates” against non-religious worldviews, as 
the term is used here, is not to say that the law is morally wrong or illegitimate; 
on this usage, only unjust discrimination is morally wrong or illegitimate. 
11.  Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701–716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
12. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
15. See id.
16. Insofar as a classically theistic religion, for example, makes participating in some
practice a necessary condition for salvation, it seems reasonable to think that participation 
in the relevant practice is a moral obligation.  Otherwise, it is hard to see why that practice
would in any way be relevant in divine judgment of a person’s life. 
222
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“Discrimination” is thus used here in a purely descriptive sense connoting 
no more than that two groups are, as a matter of principle or policy, being
treated differently. 
Nevertheless, there is a question of whether such differential treatment—
that is, discrimination—is morally legitimate or unjust.  A recent controversy 
in the U.S. sheds light on the very real moral issue that arises in connection
with such discrimination.  Consider the accommodations offered to Rowan 
County Clerk, Kim Davis, who refused to comply with the Supreme Court 
decision that established marriage equality as the law of the land.17 Davis 
refused to issue marriage licenses to gay couples on the ground that issuing 
marriage licenses to gay couples would violate her religious beliefs.18 
Initially, the state handled the Davis case in the manner one might expect.19 
When Davis refused to comply with a court order to issue marriage licenses 
to gay couples, the state successfully sought a court order compelling her to
perform her duties under her job description.20  When she declined, she 
was held in contempt of court and incarcerated for a brief period of time.21 
Over time, the state response assumed a shape that one might not expect. 
Eventually, the judge released her, and she returned to work.22  Instead of 
terminating her employment or asking her to resign, the state allowed her 
to have her name removed from marriage certificates, so that she could
avoid any appearance of endorsing same-sex marriage.23  In effect, if not 
intent, Davis was rewarded for refusing to comply with lawful orders with 
which she was obligated to comply; the state simply changed her job 
responsibilities without changing her position or pay-grade so that she
could avoid what she took as the sublimely distasteful task of treating
same-sex and different-sex couples equally.
The moral issue arises because Title VII does not protect conscientious 
objections grounded in non-religious worldviews and hence would not
 17. See, e.g., Pete Williams, Does Kim Davis, Kentucky Clerk Blocking Gay Marriages,




19. See, e.g., id.
 20. Id. 
21. Mariano Castillo & Kevin Conlon, Kim Davis Stands Ground, but Same-Sex 





























    
 
   




      
  
   
    
require an employer to accommodate objections to same-sex marriage
grounded in secular moral convictions.  Accordingly, a public (or private) 
employer could terminate an employee who refused to perform some duty 
that falls within the core responsibilities of the employment position on 
moral grounds that are purely secular in character.24  On my view, this should 
have been Davis’s fate; if one is not prepared to carry out the responsibilities 
in one’s job description, one should not take the job. 
Specifically, the issue is what would morally justify differential treatment
of religious and non-religious conscientious objection.  At first glance, it 
seems arbitrary and therefore unfair to require employers to accommodate
religion-based conscientious objections but allow employers to terminate
employees for secular conscientious objections.25 Of course, initial appearances 
might be deceiving, as there might be some morally salient property that 
distinguishes conscientious objection grounded in religious worldviews 
from conscientious objection grounded in non-religious worldviews.  In 
particular, religious worldviews might possess some distinctive property 
lacked by non-religious worldviews that endow the former, but not the 
latter, with the kind of moral significance that warrants a special protection.
But this is not something that can simply be assumed without argument. 
What is needed, then, to justify state discrimination in favor of religious 
worldviews—and hence against non-religious worldviews—is an argument 
that identifies some morally salient feature that distinguishes religious 
worldviews from non-religious worldviews and warrants special protection
of the former.  In what follows below, I will consider whether there are 
any such distinguishing features of religion that would justify special
24. It is reasonable to conjecture here that many employers, in the absence of a legal
compulsion to accommodate secular conscientious objection, would terminate an agnostic 
or atheist for doing what Davis did.  First, accommodation frequently comes at some cost
to employers; removing Davis’s name from marriage certificates certainly cost something 
in terms of time and money. See, e.g., Gary Minor, Kim Davis, Religious Freedom and
Accommodations, PUB. SAFETY (Nov. 13, 2015), http://inpublicsafety.com/2015/11/kim­
davis-religious-freedom-and-accommodations/ [https://perma.cc/9VYM-ZPME]; Samuel 
Smith, Kim Davis Finally Gets Religious Freedom Accommodation to Keep Name off Gay 
Marriage Licenses, CHRISTIAN POST (Apr. 15, 2016, 11:32 AM), http://www.christianpost. 
com/news/kim-davis-gets-religious-freedom-accommodation-keep-name-off-gay-marriage- 
licenses-161821/ [https://perma.cc/F6GQ-3ZKG]. Second, atheists are commonly distrusted
by theists, who vastly outnumber atheists.  See, e.g., Justin McCarthy, In U.S., Socialist 
Presidential Candidates Least Appealing, GALLUP (June 22, 2015), http://www.gallup.
com/poll/183713/socialist-presidential-candidates-least-appealing.aspx [https://perma.cc/
AA95-N9TF]. But nothing in the Article turns on such conjecture on my part. 
25. Even if that is not likely, Title VII allows this, because it does not require 
accommodation of secular conscientious objection. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(2012); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“Discriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has 
proscribed.”). 
224
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constitutional and statutory protection of religious worldviews and would 
hence validate state discrimination against non-religious worldviews.
II. JUSTIFYING PROTECTING AN INTEREST WITH AN ENUMERATED 





Legal protection of one person’s right typically, if not necessarily, imposes
legal constraints on the autonomy or freedom of other persons.26  For
example, a statutory right to life held by X entails legal obligations on the
part of other persons not to engage in acts contrived to kill X without what
is, as a matter of law, just cause.  Similarly, constitutional rights typically
impose constraints on what democratic majorities can enact through their
elected officials.  The right to speech, most obviously, limits what elected
officials can do with respect to regulating expressive behaviors, but in a
democracy it also limits what citizens can do through their elected officials
—whose duty is to represent those citizens—with respect to regulating
expressive behaviors. 
Accordingly, the issue of whether an interest should be protected with
a constitutional right is, at least in part, an issue of political morality.
There is nothing controversial about this.  As laws typically regulate
behavior by restricting options otherwise available to autonomous moral 
agents, the enactment of a new law should be morally justified.  Although 
a special constitutional right to religious freedom, on its face, seems to be 
concerned with expanding freedom, it also restricts the political freedom 
and power of citizens by constraining what they can do through their
elected officials with respect to enacting laws.  For this reason, a special 
constitutional right to religious freedom requires a moral justification, as 
restrictions on the freedom of competent adults is presumptively problematic
from the standpoint of political morality. 
The issue of how to justify a constitutional right is a difficult one, but
this much should be clear. Rights of any kind are intended to protect interests 
that all rational persons can be presumed to have.  The right to life, for example, 
protects the interests that all rational persons have in the continuation of their
biological lives, while the right to property protects the interests all rational
26. For a general discussion of the relationship between legal rights and legal obligations, 
see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913).  The discussion here follows Hohfeld’s
still influential analysis.
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persons have in being able to accumulate material things that satisfy important
wants and needs. 
Accordingly, whether or not a constitutional right is justified will clearly 
depend, at least in part,27 on the nature and importance of the interest
protected. Our interests in the continuation of our lives and in being able 
to exclude other persons from consuming what properly belongs to us are 
clearly of a character and importance that warrant legal protection in the 
form of constitutional rights.  The nature of the interest, of course, includes 
some reference to the legitimacy of the interest; I might have prudential 
interests in another person’s property (perhaps, for example, I covet her 
big flat-screen television), but those interests are not legitimate in an 
appropriate sense and hence do not morally warrant protection by a special 
legal right.
The idea that an interest warrants protection by a special constitutional 
right seems to entail that there is something distinctive about the interest 
in the sense that it is logically independent from other interests that warrant
protection by constitutional rights. Insofar as an interest warrants protection
by a right that cannot logically be derived from other rights, the interest 
would have to be different from those protected by other rights. Accordingly,
the idea that religious freedom warrants protection by a special constitutional 
right implies that the relevant interest in religious freedom is different from
those protected by constitutional rights to freedom of speech, conscience,
thought, association, and other liberty rights. 
This means that the claim that an interest in X morally warrants
protection by a special constitutional right implies that there is something 
that distinguishes X from others things giving rise to distinct interests that
warrant protection by special rights.  Insofar as there is an interest in religious
freedom that warrants protection by a special right, there would have to 
be something distinctive about religion per se. If I1 is an interest we have
in X but not Y, and I2 is an interest we have in Y but not X, then there 
would have to be a property or set of properties that distinguish what it is
to be an X from what it is to be a Y.  In such a case, X and Y would, then, 
have to be conceptually distinct in the sense that the natures of X and Y
are constituted by a set of properties that differ with respect to at least one 
property.
Here, it is important to notice that the conceptual inquiry is important
because the properties that distinguish X from Y would have to explain
the different interests that people have in X and Y.  As a logical matter, the
only way to explain how we would have an interest in X that we do not have 
in Y is to identify some property that X has and Y lacks.  Any properties 
27. See discussion supra note 8.
226
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that X and Y share could not give rise to different interests in X that we
do not also have in Y.  Thus, in assessing whether a special right to religious
freedom is warranted, it is necessary to try to get clear on what constitutes 
something as a religious, as opposed to non-religious, worldview. 
Of course, the mere fact that two things give rise to distinct interests 
does not imply that either or all the relevant interests morally warrant
protection in the form of a special right.  People have many interests in
many different things, and it should be clear that not all of them warrant 
special protection by a constitutional right.  We have interests in being told
the truth, but it seems clear that the law should not protect us against all 
deceptions—and certainly not by providing a special constitutional right 
to always being told the truth.
Accordingly, one necessary consideration in deciding whether an interest
warrants protection by a special right has to do with the importance or 
strength of the value in the interest.  The reason that the interest in property
warrants protection by a special right is the importance of that interest.
An interest in something that can be used to achieve ends that are morally
and prudentially trifling simply does not rise to the level of something that
would warrant protection by a special right.  As a matter of political morality,
it would rarely, if ever, make sense to afford constitutional protection to 
an interest that is trivial in value.  Obviously, only interests that rise to some
threshold level of importance morally warrant constitutional protection in
the form of a special right. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see below, moral considerations are not the
only considerations that are relevant with respect to the question of whether
the interest in religious freedom should be protected by a special right. 
Epistemic considerations, of course, are always relevant with respect to
making an argument that would constitute a justification of any conclusion— 
including conclusions having to do with whether an interest in an object
should, as a matter of political morality, be protected by a constitutional 
right; after all, every argument is subject to epistemic standards of good
reasoning. But epistemic considerations will figure more prominently in
my argument than is usual in discussions as to whether an interest should 
be protected by a special constitutional right. 
 227
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III. A FIRST STEP TOWARDS EVALUATING WHETHER 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SHOULD BE PROTECTED
 




Traditionally, theorists have sought to determine whether the law should 
provide special protection to religious freedom by attempting to identify 
what is distinctive about religion as such in order to determine whether 
there is something distinctive about religion that, as a matter of political 
morality, warrants legal protection.28  As Brian Leiter puts the matter: 
In asking whether there is something special about religion that bears on religious
toleration, we are not asking whether there is some feature (or features) of religious
belief and practice that warrant principled toleration of religion on either moral or 
epistemic grounds.  There plainly are such features, for example, that religious beliefs
are often matters of conscience . . . .  If there is a special reason to tolerate religion
it has to be because there are . . . features that all and only religious beliefs have,
either as a matter of (conceptual or other) necessity . . . .29 
There are thus two issues that need to be addressed.  The first is to identify
those properties common to all and only religions that constitute something
as a religion—or, otherwise put, to explicate the concept or nature of
religion. The second is to determine whether those properties, either singly 
or jointly, have sufficient moral value that warrants protecting the associated 
interests with a special constitutional right to religious freedom. 
Leiter identifies three distinguishing features, or essential properties, of
religious belief thought to explain why law should tolerate religion qua 
religion. First, a religion makes categorical demands on action—that is, 
demands that “must be satisfied no matter what an individual’s antecedent 
desires and no matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers
up.”30  Second, a religion contains certain views immune from the claims
of reason or evidence in the following sense: these claims are not held in 
virtue of satisfying ordinary standards of epistemic justification.31  Third,
a religion provides “existential consolation” by providing “solutions” to 
the problem of death, the problem of pain, and the problem of explaining
and sanctioning a community’s morality.32
 28. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, and Why Religion
Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24, 25 (2013); Andrew Koppelman,
Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 73 (2012); Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1352–55 (2012). 
29. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 26–27 (2013).
30. Id. at 34. 
31. Id.
 32. Id. at 51–52 (quoting JULIAN YOUNG, NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 13 
(2006)). 
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The difficulty with this analysis is that there are non-religious worldviews 
exhibiting all three of the features that putatively distinguish religion from 
non-religion. First, while it is true that religion makes categorical demands 
of followers, so do other non-religious systems of norms, such as the
norms of morality.  This is most obviously seen in negative moral norms, 
which prohibit the commission of certain acts.  The norm “Do not kill innocent 
persons” must be satisfied “no matter what incentives or disincentives the world
offers up.”33 
Second, while certain claims of religion might be thought insulated from
the demands of epistemic justification, hereinafter “epistemic immunity,”
certain claims of morality seem to share this property.  It is commonly accepted 
that a moral theory must cohere with certain foundational principles if a 
system of principles is to count as “morality.”34  One common line of 
objection to the act-utilitarian principle is to identify counterexamples 
that purport to refute this principle.35  For example, it seems to be morally 
permissible, under act-utilitarianism, to kill an innocent person if doing so 
would maximize community utility, but such an implication is regarded
as a reason for rejecting act-utilitarianism on the ground that killing an 
innocent person violates her moral right to life and is thus wrong.  These 
foundational principles seem, like religious claims, to enjoy some degree 
of epistemic immunity. 
Such immunity is not absolute, of course, but it is not absolute in the 
case of religious worldviews either.  Christianity has evolved with respect 
to many issues—although there are denominational disputes on a number 
of these issues.  Certainly, all denominations of Christianity accept that
the world is round, rather than as having “four corners,”36 and have thereby 
evolved from a geocentric view of the material structure of the universe
to a heliocentric view.  Likewise, some denominations, such as Catholicism,
 33. Id. at 34. 
34. See, e.g., Bernard Gert & Joshua Gert, The Definition of Morality, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/morality-definition/ (last
revised Feb. 8, 2016). 
35. See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/ (last updated
Oct. 22, 2015). The reason for citing one of the leading internet encyclopedias of philosophy
is to show that a philosophical claim made in the discussion enjoys widespread acceptance 
among the relevant communities of theorists. 
36. Revelation 7:1 (King James). 
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have accepted, while fundamentalist denominations have not, that evolution 
is compatible with the creation story of Genesis.37 
It is true, of course, that there are some limits to what can be changed 
within Christianity without changing it so much that it can no longer be 
characterized accurately as “Christianity.”  There are some claims essential 
to Christianity that distinguish it from other religious traditions and non­
religious worldviews. Necessary constituents of Christianity include the 
idea that God exists and that Jesus is one of the three divine persons 
constituting the triune God.38 
But the same is true of any substantive theory of morality that posits the 
existence of constraints on other people’s behaviour for which they are 
accountable. One could not call a theory a substantive theory of morality
without there being some obligations owed to other people or without
assuming that people are accountable in virtue of having certain characteristics,
usually thought to be rationality and free will.39  This is true regardless of 
whether one is an objectivist or relativist about the ultimate nature of moral
principles. Morality and religion are in much the same boat with respect
to insulating some claims from revision. 
Finally, there are a number of problems with the idea that a religion
must provide a narrative that affords existential comfort to believers. Many
religions, of course, do this with promises of heavenly bliss, nirvana,
or the cessation of existence entirely, but there is no reason to think that a
religion must provide such a narrative. There is nothing in the nature of 
a religion that ensures that a happy ending must be possible for everyone.
For example, the Calvinist doctrine of pre-election asserts that every 
person’s ultimate fate has been pre-determined by God;40 insofar as this 
implies that there is nothing one can do in this world to change one’s
predestined fate, this doctrine, together with the traditional doctrine of 
hell, could elicit anxiety about one’s ultimate fate as easily as provide 
37. See, e.g., POPE PIUS XII, HUMANI GENERIS [THE HUMAN RACE] ¶ 36 (1950). 
38. For example, the Nicene Creed purports, like other creeds, to state the essential 
claims of Christianity.  See, e.g., ENGLISH LANGUAGE LITURGICAL CONSULTATION, PRAYING
TOGETHER 17 (1988).
39. See, e.g., William K. Frankena, The Concept of Morality, 63 J. PHIL. 688, 688–89
(1966).
40. See, e.g., VICTOR A. SHEPHERD, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF FAITH IN THE
THEOLOGY OF JOHN CALVIN 39–47 (1983).  Likewise, one could view a cycle of unending 
reincarnations as something other than reassuring.  Personally, and this might say more 
about me than about people in general, but I would prefer not to have any kind of life after 
death: not heaven, not hell, and not reincarnation into a form that depends on the moral 
quality of the life I led.  That might be somewhat idiosyncratic on my part, but an
idiosyncratic opinion is enough to support the point here, as long as it expresses a view 
that is not irrational.  Perhaps, my reasons are not the best, but they are plausible enough 
to make this a rational view—and that is all that is needed here.
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existential comfort. Further, many theories of morality are also equipped 
to provide a foundation for a narrative that affords existential comfort. 
Questions about the meaning of life, for example, are typically concerned
with the moral point of life.  “What is the point of my life?” is a moral 
question. It is true that some moral theories might provide a discomfiting 
answer, but many will identify the meaning of life, as Aristotle did, as living 
the morally good life.41  As far as my own view is concerned, the meaning
of my life consists in the help and kindness I offer to other people and in
the relationships I enjoy with them provided these acts and relationships 
satisfy the relevant moral norms. 
The problem here is not so much with Leiter’s analysis as it is with the 
difficulties in identifying a set of properties that would distinguish religious
worldviews from non-religious worldviews.  As we just saw, above, the 
properties identified by Leiter as putatively distinguishing religious worldviews 
from non-religious worldviews42 simply do not succeed in doing so.  Morality 
shares all three of the candidate distinguishing properties with religion.  One
could add other properties, of course.  One might think, for example, that 
one of the distinguishing conceptual properties about religion is that it 
provides an account of how the world began.  But even if this is true of 
every religion, there are clearly other areas of thought that do exactly the 
same thing—such as the Big Bang Theory in physics.43  Combine the
appropriate scientific claims with an appropriate theory of morality, and 
the result seems to be a non-religious worldview that shares all these properties
with religious worldviews. 
Similarly, one might think that the difference between the two is that 
religion makes claims about “ultimate reality,” but there is no account of
this notion that would clearly distinguish religious worldviews from non­
religious worldviews that contain science and morality.  A scientific 
theory—perhaps with the aid of some philosophical metaphysics—can
make claims about what is ultimate about reality in an intuitive sense.  One 
might think, on the strength of such a view, that ultimate reality consists 
in the set of material objects that are contained in the universe; the assumption 
in this case, which is not a necessary component of a non-religious worldview,
41. See Sarah Broadie, Philosophical Introduction to ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 12–13 (Sarah Broadie & Christopher Rowe eds., Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
42. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
43. JULIO A. GONZALO, THE INTELLIGIBLE UNIVERSE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAST
THIRTEEN BILLION YEARS 111 (2d ed. 2008). 
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would be that there are no non-material objects in the universe.  Insofar 
as such a non-religious worldview contains all the descriptive and
normative elements that explain the existence of the world and guide us 
through its complexities and are thought to give religious worldviews their 
significance, the interests to which both worldviews give rise, at the 
conceptual level, are the same—on the assumption that all the potential
distinguishing conceptual properties have been identified here. 
The relevant result of this inability to provide a rigorous conceptual
account of the nature of religion that distinguishes religious from non­
religious worldviews is that existing conceptual accounts do not pick out 
an interest that persons have in all and only religious worldviews that
would morally warrant protection by a special right to religious freedom.44 
Insofar as the four properties identified above exhaust what we can say
about the nature of religion, the only morally salient interests to which 
religious worldviews give rise would be shared by a non-religious worldview 
formed by a set of claims that include scientific and moral claims.  This,
of course, would not imply that religious freedom should not be protected
by an enumerated constitutional right; there might be many reasons for
providing such protection to religious freedom.45  What it does imply is
that we have no grounds for thinking, based on just an analysis of what is 
distinctive about the nature of religion, that such a right should be special 
in the sense defined here. 
This, of course, falls short of the claim I wish to defend in this Article. 
Although I ultimately argue that religious freedom does not morally 
warrant protection by a special right, it would be premature to draw that 
conclusion at this stage of the analysis.  Pre-theoretically, we understand 
that there is a difference between a religious worldview and a non­
religious worldview and can usually distinguish one from another, even if 
the concept is somewhat vague, when we see core examples of both.  And 
a pre-theoretical understanding of the notion of religion is reliable enough
to ground an inquiry into whether religious freedom should be protected
by law; after all, we do not need more than a pre-theoretical understanding
of the notion of law to coherently discuss that same issue. 
44. See LEITER, supra note 29, at 26–27. 
45. It is worth noting that a distinct right to religious freedom might be warranted
by a failure on the part of courts and legislatures to view the rights to speech and other
relevant liberty rights as affording the same protections to religious worldviews as non­
religious worldviews.  Likewise, a distinct right to religious freedom might be warranted 
if, despite existing protections of speech, thought, etc., a religious tradition were being
persecuted.  But such considerations would warrant only explicitly including a distinct right to
religious freedom; since it would not warrant any protections of religious worldviews not 
afforded to non-religious worldviews, such a right would not be special in character. 
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IV. TAKING A LESS GENERAL APPROACH: INTERESTS IMPLICATED BY 
VARIOUS PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
At this point, then, it seems that the best way to proceed is to look at
various cases of religious content to see whether the interests to which 
they give rise could ground a special right to religion.  The idea here is to
try to examine all the interests to which different sets of religious doctrines 
could give rise, and to show that none will provide adequate support for 
the idea that the state is justified in discriminating in favor of religious 
worldviews by providing a special right to religious freedom.  If this can
be done, then it follows that religious worldviews do not warrant the 
protection of a special right. 
One useful place to begin is with purely materialistic worldviews that
might be characterized as “religious.”  Although it is true that many
paradigmatic cases of religious worldviews posit the existence of immaterial 
beings and forces, it is not obvious that this is a necessary condition for a 
set of doctrines to count as being “religious” in character.  Whether such 
views are properly called “religion” is, of course, likely to be contentious. 
Regardless of whether these views are properly construed as “religious,”
it should be clear that they do not pick out any interest that is lacked by
paradigmatically non-religious worldviews that include an appropriate set
of morally normative and descriptive claims.  Either way, it seems clear
that all of the relevant interests are adequately protected by the other liberty 
rights—assuming that non-religious worldviews are adequately protected 
by such rights.46 
Spinoza’s idiosyncratic conception of God helps to make this point.
Spinoza famously took the view that the name “God,” properly used, simply
picks out the totality of things in the universe.47  As the view is described 
by Steven Nadler: 
46. If non-religious views are not adequately protected, then the appropriate response to
protect all of these materialistic views would be to strengthen the protections associated 
with the relevant liberty rights, and not provide these views with a special right to religious
worship. After all, the problem is that non-religious worldviews are not adequately
protected. Insofar as materialistic religious worldviews do not involve any interest that 
materialistic non-religious worldviews lack, there is nothing warranting the extension of 
protections to religions that are not purely materialistic in character.
47. See Steven Nadler, Baruch Spinoza, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/ (last revised July 4, 2016). 
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In propositions one through fifteen of Part One, Spinoza presents the basic 
elements of his picture of God.  God is the infinite, necessarily existing (that is,
uncaused), unique substance of the universe. There is only one substance in the 
universe; it is God; and everything else that is, is in God.48
Spinoza can non-standardly be interpreted as committed to the claim that 
only material things exist in the universe, and hence as affirming a 
materialistic conception of God and the world.  As should be clear, it is
hard to see how such a view would give rise to any interests that would
warrant protection different from that afforded to non-religious worldviews 
with the appropriate components.
But philosophers usually interpret Spinoza as claiming that the universe
consists of two kinds of objects: material things—characterized by “extension” 
—and ideas.49  On this interpretation, Spinoza could be interpreted as a dualist
to the extent that he believes that ideas are “substances,” rather than attributes 
or properties, and hence are properly included in an ontological account of
the world. Either way, it is hard to see how this view gives rise to any
interests that are not antecedently and adequately protected by the liberty
rights that protect non-religious worldviews.  Whether ideas are attributes or
substances, no one doubts that they are part of our world. Although a
materialistic view would reject that they are substances that should be 
included in the ontology of the world, nothing of relevance seems to turn 
on that difference. Either way, it is difficult to discern how Spinoza’s 
worldview would give rise to any interests that are distinct from those to
which non-religious worldviews give rise.  For this reason, if Spinoza’s view 
amounts to a religion, there is little reason to think it would warrant the
protection of a special right to religious freedom. 
One might be tempted to think that if mental entities are substances, the 
existence of such substances gives rise to interests distinct from those to 
which non-religious worldviews give rise.  In its most familiar version, 
first made famous by Descartes, ontological dualism takes the following
shape.50 There are two kinds of substances in the world, mental and material. 
Human beings, in particular, are a combination of material body and 
immaterial soul capable of mutual causal interaction; on this view, it is 
logically—as opposed to nomologically—possible for souls to exist 
independently of bodies.51
 48. Id. (discussing BARUCH SPINOZA, Ethics, in  THE COLLECTED WORKS OF SPINOZA
408–20 (Edwin Curley ed. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1985)).
49. See id.
 50. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
OF DESCARTES 190 (Elizabeth S. Haldane trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1911) (1641). 
51. Id.
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What is particularly noteworthy here is that many of the most familiar 
religions to people in the Western World are commonly interpreted to
incorporate an ontological dualism between bodies and souls.52  Although 
this might seem to suggest that these religious views give rise to interests
distinct from those to which non-religious worldviews give rise that
require the protection of a special right, this is a mistake for two reasons.
First, it is simply not clear how knowing that what I take to be a mind is a 
substance and not merely an attribute or mental process, by itself, would 
give rise to some new interest that requires the protection of a special right; 
that piece of information alone seems normatively insignificant.  Second,
although ontological dualism is more common in religious worldviews
than non-religious worldviews, ontological dualism is logically independent
of paradigmatically religious considerations.53  One can be either an atheist 
or an agnostic and coherently hold ontological dualism.54 Accordingly, the
claim that immaterial objects or forces exist, which is common to many views 
pre-theoretically understood as “religious,” does not seem to give rise to any
interests that non-religious worldviews do not give rise to.  Therefore, that 
claim would not help to justify the claim that religious worldviews warrant
protection by a special right to religious freedom.55 
Of course, everyone has an interest in religious freedom insofar as some
religious doctrine might be true, and it is reasonable to think we have a 
strong interest in having the freedom to pursue the truth—and one that 
should be protected by a special constitutional right. The problem, however,
is that this interest is already protected by constitutional rights to speech
and thought that do not discriminate among religious and non-religious 
worldviews. Insofar as such interests are already adequately protected by
these other rights, the interest in truth cannot bear the weight of justifying 
a special right to religious freedom, which, as we have seen, requires the
 52. See id. at 191. 
53. COLIN CAMPBELL, THE EASTERNIZATION OF THE WEST: A THEMATIC ACCOUNT 
OF CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MODERN ERA 63–64 (Routledge 2016) (2007). 
54. See, e.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Explaining Why This Body Gives Rise to Me
qua Subject Instead of Someone Else: An Argument for Classical Substance Dualism, 4
RELIGIOUS STUD. 431, 436 (2011).  The argument is one for ontological dualism that does 
not rely on any presuppositions that there exists anything plausibly called God.  Although 
the argument is certainly vulnerable to objections, there is little reason to think that no 
such argument could succeed without assuming the existence of a supreme being. 
55. As we will see below, such views are vulnerable to the same evidentiary objection 
that I will make with respect to classically theistic views.  See infra Part VI. 
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identification of an important interest that arises out of religious worldviews, 
but not out of non-religious worldviews. 
Further, one might think that religious worldviews give rise to an interest 
in ensuring that one has the proper relationship with God; evangelical 
Christian views frequently emphasize as the foundation of faith that one 
has a “personal relationship with Jesus.”56  The idea here is a morally normative 
one: insofar as one is subject to divine punishment for lacking such a 
relationship, having such a relationship is morally required, and we have 
a strong interest in ensuring that we have the appropriate liberty rights to 
do what is morally required.
That we have a strong interest in ensuring that we have the appropriate
liberty rights to do what is morally required is not enough to warrant a 
special right to religious freedom. Everyone has a strong interest in doing 
what is morally required and hence in having sufficient liberty rights to 
allow that. But a special right to religious freedom is not needed to protect
those interests, as the other liberty rights, including a right to conscience,
afford sufficient protection to that interest, while the rights to free speech
and association afford protection for the interest in being able to access
religious doctrines and participate, other things being equal, in relevant 
church practices.
One remaining place to look for an interest that will do the relevant
work is to religions with a doctrine of the afterlife that is connected to the
satisfaction of certain normative ethical standards, as it is well-established 
that one of the most common motivations for religious belief is a concern
to deny the permanency of death.57  It is clear, as a conceptual matter, that
any worldview that contains such doctrines is “religious” in character;
indeed, the inclusion of a moralized doctrine of the afterlife is a conceptually
sufficient condition for characterizing a worldview as “religious”—although 
it is not a conceptually necessary condition. 
It is obvious that at least two of the classically theistic religions,58 Islam
and Christianity, contain such doctrines, but other religions do too,
including Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism.59  On these latter
 56. See, e.g., John Suk, A Personal Relationship with Jesus?, 20 PERSPECTIVES, no.
9, Nov. 2005, at 5, 5. 
57. See, e.g., Mark Jordan Landau et al., The Motivational Underpinnings of
Religion, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 743, 743–44 (2004); Ara Norenzayan & Ian G. Hansen, 
Belief in Supernatural Agents in the Face of Death, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 174, 174–75 (2006). 
58. The term “classically theistic religions” is used here to refer to those worldviews 
that include the existence of a divine being who is omnipotent, omniscient, morally
perfect, and both creator and moral sovereign of the world. 
59. For a general explanation of the doctrine, along with the religious traditions that 
contain this doctrine, see, for example, Karma, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.
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religious views, people are reincarnated into a new life after the death of 
one life.60  The quality of one’s next life, on these views, is determined by 
Karma, an impersonal moral force in the world that addresses the balance
of justice in the world and seeks, so to speak, to correct those injustices.61 
Here it is important to note that the quality of a person’s afterlife, on all
such accounts, is determined by the moral worth of the life he or she led
in this world.  In the case of Christianity and Islam, those who live morally
worthwhile lives (which include, on standard accounts, as necessary
constituents the requirement that one have faith in God) are rewarded with 
eternal bliss, while those who live morally unworthy lives are rewarded
with eternal torment.62  In the case of religious traditions that include the 
doctrine of Karma, persons who lead morally worthwhile lives will
be reincarnated into circumstances that are happier and more pleasurable, 
while those who do not will be reincarnated into circumstances that are 
not.63  Such doctrines, always absent from non-religious worldviews, would 
obviously give rise to interests to which non-religious worldviews do not. 
The next few sections are concerned with such views.64 
V. IN FAVOR OF A SPECIAL RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE 

NATURE AND STRENGTH OF THE INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS
 
FREEDOM ON CLASSICALLY THEISTIC VIEWS
 
A. Classical Theism and Other Kinds of Religious Doctrine 
As will be recalled, the nature and strength of the interest in religious 
freedom must be considered in determining whether that interest warrants,
as a matter of political morality, protection by constitutional entrenchment 
of a special fundamental right.65  Inasmuch as we lack a conceptual account 
of religion that would adequately distinguish religious from non-religious
worldviews, we cannot, as we have seen, identify an interest that is common 
newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Karma [https://perma.cc/U94S-WT7S] (last visited Mar. 21,
2017).
60. Reincarnation, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia. 
org/entry/Reincarnation [https://perma.cc/LT6W-TZKP] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
61. Id.
62. Linda M. Tober & F. Stanle Lusby, Heaven and Hell, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGION 3884, 3884–85 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
63. Karma, AN INTRODUCTORY DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS STUDIES
706–07 (2007).
64. See infra Parts V–VII. 
65. See supra Part II. 
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to all and only religious worldviews.66  Accordingly, the last section 
attempted to identify interests that arise out of certain doctrines that are 
prominent in some, but not all, religions.  This section is concerned with
one clear interest that arises under classically theistic views, such as 
Christianity and Islam.  In particular, this section is concerned with the 
interests that arise from the moralized doctrines of the afterlife common
to these religions.67 
The notion of an afterlife implies, albeit in different ways depending on
other elements of the relevant doctrines, the existence of certain immaterial
forces (such as Karma) or entities (such as an immaterial God or immaterial
souls); the same problems that I raise for the two classically theistic traditions 
I consider will be problems for other traditions positing the existence of 
immaterial forces and objects.  Insofar as something fairly characterized
as a “religion” does not posit immaterial forces or entities, it would not seem 
to give rise to any interests that are distinct from those implicated by certain 
non-religious worldviews and would adequately be protected as derived from
existing special rights to speech, belief, conscience, thought, association, et 
cetera. Accordingly, in this section, I will consider only interests implicated 
by two classically theistic religions: Christianity and Islam.68 
B. Identifying the Relevant Interests in Traditional 

Christianity and Islam 

Traditional Christianity and Islam share a conception of the consequences 
of belief and non-belief.  Both hold that the consequence of correct belief 
is an eternal reward.69 Any person with a genuine saving faith has an
eternity of pleasure in the form of what is usually called “heaven” as her
reward; such pleasure is usually thought to exceed anything that can be
experienced during an earthly life.70  Both religions hold that the consequence
of non-belief is an eternity of suffering in the form of what is usually called
“hell”; such suffering is usually thought to be unmatched by anything that
can be experienced during an earthly life.71  Whether a person has what is
 66. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
67. By “moralized” here, I mean only the view that what kind of afterlife one
experiences is determined by the moral quality of one’s life before physical death.
68. Judaism does not appear to have a well-developed and deeply entrenched
doctrine of an afterlife and hence implicates somewhat different interests. See, e.g., Tracey
R. Rich, Olam Ha-Ba: The Afterlife, JUDAISM 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/olamhaba.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5RBZ-ACJM] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).  To the extent that there is a 
doctrine of the afterlife similar to those included in Christianity and Judaism, the argument
below applies to it.
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usually called heaven or hell as her ultimate fate is a matter of divine
justice. 
The relevant interests, then, implicated by Christianity’s and Islam’s
conception of divine justice are the interests in experiencing intense pleasure, 
such as occurs with heaven, and in avoiding intense pain, such as occurs
with hell.72  Accordingly, the magnitude of the value of, or strength of the
interest in, religious freedom would seem the highest that is logically possible.
There simply could not be a stronger prudential interest than in avoiding the 
torment of hell; complete cessation of conscious existence seems preferable
to eternal torment as conceived by these religions. The suffering associated
with hell, according to these religious traditions, exceeds the earthly suffering 
associated with being tortured, dying of cancer, clinical depression, the
grief of losing a loved one, and any other pain that one can imagine combined. 
Regardless of the strength of an interest in eternal bliss, there could be no
stronger narrowly prudential interest than the interest in avoiding hell. 
Accordingly, the interest in religious freedom, if Christianity or Islam 
is true, is of a nature and strength that would clearly warrant, as a matter
of political morality, legal protection in the form of a special constitutional 
right. The value of the distinctive interests in achieving eternal bliss and
avoiding eternal torment are, clearly, of sufficient strength to warrant protection
by a special constitutional right.  Further, as these doctrines entail the existence 
of these interests that are special in the sense that they do not arise in
connection with ordinary worldly existence, the rights to which they give
rise would seem to warrant a distinct protection.  At this stage in the analysis, 
the evidence would seem to entail that the interests in religious freedom
warrant the protection of a special constitutional right.
72. This is not to claim that these are the only relevant interests that arise in 
connection with these doctrines of the afterlife.  One might think that the relevant interests 
have to do with maintaining the proper relationship with the deity or with living a morally 
good life.  All but one of these interests, however, were considered and rejected in the last 
section. See supra Part IV.  The interest in living a morally good life is considered below. 
See infra Part VII. 
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VI. AGAINST A SPECIAL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM: THE ABSENCE OF ANY PERSUASIVE REASON
 
TO THINK CLASSICAL THEISM IS TRUE
 
A. The Importance of the Epistemic Issue of Whether There
 
is Reason to Accept Classical Theism in Assessing 





The reasoning in the last section overlooks a question of potentially
decisive importance: what reason do we have to think that we actually
have an interest in religious freedom that could be threatened without the 
protection of a fundamental constitutional right?  Whether or not the law 
should protect an interest depends on whether we have reason to think 
there is a threat to that interest that should be protected against.  If there
exists a being that punishes disbelief with eternal torment, then we clearly
have an interest in having the freedom to do what is needed to avoid 
eternal torment, and one that should be protected by law.  But if there does 
not exist such a being, then we clearly do not have such an interest— 
regardless of what some privileged text in the form of a “scripture” might 
say. 
But the only way for us to determine whether such a being exists is
through whatever arguments or evidence there might be on both sides of 
the issue. It is not just that if we have adequate reason to think that such 
a being does not exist, we should not protect religious freedom with a 
special constitutional right. It is also that if we do not have adequate reason
to think that such a being exists, we should not protect religious freedom
with a special constitutional right.  From the standpoint of political morality,
it makes no sense whatsoever to impose special legal constraints on what 
the state or citizens can do by way of regulating religious freedom if we
have no reason to think religious freedom implicates any distinctive important 
interests, as would be the case with respect to the classically theistic religions 
considered here if we have no reason to believe that there exists a divine 
being who punishes sin with eternal torment. 
The importance of this epistemic issue can be seen from another ongoing 
controversy with respect to an ostensible conflict between the interest in
religious freedom and important interests of other persons.  Pharmacists
have argued that they should not be compelled by law to fill prescriptions 
for medications that violate their religious beliefs, such as birth control 
240
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pills or the “morning-after” pill.73 If pharmacists had a good reason to believe
that filling such prescriptions would increase the risk that they will be 
consigned to hell, that would also be a reason to think that they should be
able to decline such prescriptions even though doing so might cause 
significant detriment to the patient; the reason, of course, is that the interest
in avoiding eternal torment would outweigh the interest in avoiding any 
detriment to the patient by being denied access to the relevant medication. 
However, if there is no good reason for thinking that pharmacists will be 
divinely punished for filling such prescriptions because there is no plausible
reason for thinking their religious beliefs are true, it would be wrong for 
the law to allow pharmacists to impose the detriments we know will occur 
on patients who cannot get those medications.
Indeed, it would be as wrong, as a matter of political morality, to allow 
the imposition of such effects on others on the basis of a pharmacist’s religious 
beliefs as it would be to allow this on the basis of a unjustified belief that 
an alien from another planet will kill her if she did not fill the prescription. 
It is crucial that we have adequate reason to believe that the relevant claimed 
interests can be threatened before we enact laws that allow persons who are
licensed to provide critical public services to refuse to do so in cases where
they believe such interests are threatened.  Laws must be grounded in reasons
for thinking they are justified; and this requires an examination of whether
all the underlying support has sufficient epistemic justification. 
The issue, then, is whether we have sufficient reason to believe that any 
of these religious traditions are true.  The justification for any special right 
includes non-moral epistemic considerations having to do with whether 
there is reason to think we have an interest that could actually be threatened.
In most cases, the epistemic issue is so easily and obviously settled that it
does not require argument.  It is obvious we have an interest in the continuation 
of conscious life because it is obvious that everybody dies and everybody 
has a strong presumptive desire to continue living.74  It is obvious we have
an interest in being able to use certain material things and in excluding 
others from appropriating them because it is obvious that we need to use 
73. See, e.g., Pharmacist Conscience Clauses: Laws and Information, NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/pharmacist-conscience­
clauses-laws-and-information.aspx [https://perma.cc/RY3B-B8FV] (last updated May 2012). 
74. I use the term “presumptive” here to indicate that there may be circumstances 
in which a person’s interest in continuing life is extinguished, such as when one has a rapidly
degenerative condition causing suffering that cannot be alleviated and that inevitably culminates
in death.
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certain things in order to continue to live and thrive.  The justifications for 
special legal protections of life and property include these facts, although 
they are so obvious that we lose sight of them because the underlying epistemic 
justification is, from the standpoint of the law, conclusive.75 
In the absence of sufficient reason to think we have a distinct interest in
X that can actually be threatened, legal protection in the form of a special
right to X is not warranted.  Accordingly, there are two issues that have to 
be addressed, although in most cases only one requires explicit attention, 
in providing an adequate justification for providing legal protection of an
interest through a special constitutional right: (1) the moral issue of whether 
the value of the putative interest in X is of the correct type and of sufficient 
importance to warrant protection by law; and (2) the epistemic issue of 
whether we have sufficient reason to think the relevant interest in X can
actually be threatened by some thing or behavior in this world. These
issues, then, set two requirements for justifying such protection of X that 
are necessary conditions for justifiably protecting X with a special
constitutional right. 
It remains, then, to apply (1) and (2) to the case of religious freedom as 
it pertains to the relevant religious traditions. The doctrine of divine justice,
common in broad outlines to both Christianity and Islam, ostensibly satisfies 
the moral condition (1), which has to do with the nature and strength of
the relevant interests.76  Nevertheless, there remains the issue—addressed 
extensively in the literature in philosophy of religion but not in the literature 
in normative political philosophy concerning the justification of a right to
religious worship—of whether, and to what extent, we have reason to
believe that there exists a personal God who carries out such a doctrine of 
divine justice.  Accordingly, the next subsection attempts a somewhat 
cursory explication and assessment of the arguments from the extensive
literature in philosophy of religion pertaining to whether God, as classical
theism conceives it, exists.77
 75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
 76. See Suzanne Last Stone, Justice, Mercy, and Gender in Rabbinic Thought, 8 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 139, 143–44 (1996) (discussing “divine justice” in
Christianity and Judaism). 
77. As mentioned above, the same considerations adduced below apply with equal 
force to religions incorporating the doctrine of Karma, as well as any worldview, religious
or otherwise, positing the existence of immaterial forces or substances. See supra Sec. V.A.
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B. A Brief Description of the Arguments for God’s 

Existence and Objections to the Arguments 

There are five major arguments attempting to show the existence of an 
all-perfect God that are currently in play among contemporary philosophers
of religion: (1) the ontological argument; (2) the cosmological argument; 
(3) the moral argument; (4) the intelligent design argument; and (5) the 
fine-tuning argument.  The first three arguments are a priori in character,
while the last two are a posteriori in character.78  The discussion here will 
have to be somewhat cursory, but it accurately sums up the various arguments 
and objections in sufficient detail for the reader to decide whether the 
arguments are successful in providing adequate reason to think that there 
is a distinct interest that can be protected only by a special right to religious
freedom.
The ontological argument is not only a priori but also conceptual in this 
respect: it seeks to validly deduce the conclusion that God exists from
conceptual claims about the nature of God.79  Just as the very concept of
a bachelor implies that every bachelor is male, the very concept of God, 
according to the ontological argument, implies that God exists.  Descartes 
gives the most perspicuous formulation of the argument, which can be 
summarized as follows: 
1.	 It is a conceptual truth that God is all-perfect.
2.	 A being that exists is more nearly perfect than a being that 
does not exist.
3.	 Therefore, God exists.80 
Kant responded to the argument by challenging Premise 2 above.  On Kant’s
view, existence is not itself a property; existence is, rather, a metaphysical
78. For more detailed discussion of the ontological argument, see, for example, Kenneth 
Einar Himma, Anselm: Ontological Argument for God’s Existence, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/ [https://perma.cc/R7JW-BS95] (last visited Mar.
21, 2017) [hereinafter Himma, Ontological Argument].  For more detailed discussion of 
the design argument, see, for example, Kenneth Einar Himma, Design Arguments for the 
Existence of God, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/design/ (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Himma, Design Arguments].
79. See Himma, Ontological Argument, supra note 78. 
80. See  RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 62 (Laurence J. 
Lafleur trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ’g 1960) (1641). 
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prerequisite for having any properties at all.81  One would never think to
include “p exists” in a list of properties that would make someone a good 
parent, as existence (or possible existence) is presupposed by the task of 
making such a list. Notably, Kant’s criticism of the Cartesian version of 
the argument is widely accepted among contemporary philosophers
of religion as fatal to the argument.82 
The Kalam cosmological argument is grounded in the metaphysical 
idea that every existing thing has a cause of its existence.83  Its structure 
is quite straightforward and can be represented as follows: 
1.	 Everything that exists has a beginning and hence a cause 
of its beginning.
2.	 The universe exists and has a beginning.
3.	 Therefore, the universe has a cause of this beginning, and 
that cause is God.84 
There are a number of conspicuous problems with this argument, but a
brief discussion of one will suffice for our purposes.  Even if the premises 
are true, only the conclusion that the universe has a cause follows.  There
is nothing in the premises that would tell us anything about the nature of 
the cause; the prevailing theory in physics is that the material universe in
which we live was produced by the “Big Bang,” some kind of event that 
occurs within the context of an eternally existent multi-verse.85  It should
be clear that there is little here of evidentiary value; not surprisingly, most 
philosophers of religion reject it. 
The basic idea grounding the moral argument is that the only possible
explanation for the objectivity of morality86 is the existence of an all-perfect
 81. See, e.g., Lawrence Nolan, Descartes’ Ontological Argument, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ (last updated Sept. 2, 2015). 
As Nolan describes the argument: “Perhaps the most famous objection to the ontological 
argument is that existence is not a property or predicate. Popularized by Kant, this
objection enjoys the status of a slogan [i.e., “existence is not a predicate”] known by every
undergraduate philosophy major worth her salt.” Id.
 82. Id. There are contemporary versions of the argument that are somewhat more
sophisticated (and devilishly obscure), but all attempt to derive God’s existence from some
conceptual truth about God. See, e.g., St. Anselm, Proslogion, in ST. ANSELM:BASIC WRITINGS
(trans. S.N. Deane, 2d ed. 1962), reprinted in THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT: FROM ST.
ANSELM TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS 6 (Alvin Plantinga ed., Anchor Books 1965). 
83. See, e.g., Bruce Reichenbach, Cosmological Argument, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/cosmological-argument/ (last updated 
Oct. 26, 2012). 
84. See id.
 85. See id.
86. A claim is objective in character if and only if whether that claim is true or false 
does not depend on what any person or group of persons believes, desires, or prefers about 
that claim; indeed, the hallmark of an objective claim is that everyone can simultaneously
244
HIMMA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 11:16 AM      
 
    
 









      




   
   
 
  
   
    
  
       
 




[VOL. 54:  217, 2017] An Unjust Dogma 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
God, which somehow defines mind-independent standards of morality 
that apply across cultures.87 There are, as is true of the arguments above,
various iterations that differ from one another in terms of sophistication, 
but the basic problem is to identify a mechanism by which God’s existence 
would explain the objectivity of morality.  The most direct—and hence the 
most plausible, simplicity being an epistemic virtue88—mechanism is that 
God manufactures morality by means of his commands: if God exists 
independently of minds, then God’s existence and commands are objective,
which would imply that God’s moral commands exist objectively.89 
The most common objection to this theory (known as the Divine Command
Theory) is that if anything God commands is morally good, then God could 
bring it about that it is morally good to torture live infants, an implication 
that most theistic philosophers of religion regard as fatal to the theory.90 
While there is a more sophisticated version of the argument, the details of 
this more nuanced version do not rescue the argument.91  In the absence
of some other plausible account of how God’s existence could explain the 
be mistaken about the truth-value of an objective claim, as was presumably true when
people believed the earth is flat. The truth-makers of objective claims are all mind-independent.
Accordingly, the claim that morality is objective asserts that whether or not a moral 
judgment is true or false does not depend on what any person or group of persons believes, 
desires, or prefers about that claim. 
87. See, e.g., C. Stephen Evans, Moral Arguments for the Existence of God, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 12, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/ 
moral-arguments-god/.
88. See, e.g., Alan Baker, Simplicity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fall2013/entries/simplicity/ (last updated Feb. 25, 2010). 
89. For a general discussion of the argument, see Michael Austin, Divine Command
Theory, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c/ [https://perma.cc/
F9L6-JEQ4] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
90. See id.
91. According to Robert Adams’s version of the Divine Command Theory, what is
right and wrong is determined by the commands of a loving God. See Robert Merrihew 
Adams, A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness, in RELIGION AND MORALITY:
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 318, 322–23 (Gene Outka & John P. Reeder, Jr. eds., Anchor
Books 1973). The problem with this version of the argument is that the relevant concept
of loving is moralized.  A loving God would not command someone to torture an infant
for fun because love involves moral dispositions of concern to promote a loved one’s well­
being.  Adams’s formulation of the Divine Command Theory, and this is a standard objection 
among even theistic philosophers of religion, presupposes some moral truths about love, 
yet purports to explain the existence and content of all moral truths through God’s 
commands.
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objectivity of morality, there is nothing here that would serve as evidence 
for God’s existence.92 
The most influential remaining arguments among Christian philosophers 
are teleological arguments: Robin Collins’s fine-tuning argument93 and 
William Demski’s intelligent design argument (“ID argument”).94  The
fine-tuning argument is grounded in uncontroversial scientific studies
showing that a multiplicity of properties in the material universe had to be
more or less exactly what they are in order for the universe to support 
life.95  The idea is that the improbability of this, together with the idea that
an intelligent creator would value intelligent beings, provides some reason 
for thinking that chance is not the best explanation for the existence of life 
on this planet. 
The problem here is that the fine-tuning argument, by its own terms, 
does very little work.  Collins recognizes that the premises cannot bear the
work of a proof of God’s existence; indeed, Collins explicitly concedes: “the
argument does not say that the fine-tuning evidence proves that the universe 
was designed, or even that it is likely that the universe was designed.”96 
92. This should not be construed as suggesting there are successful secular arguments 
for thinking that morality is objective.  The issue of whether morality is objective remains 
a contentious one in moral philosophy.
93. See Robin Collins, A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God: The Fine-
Tuning Design Argument, in REASON FOR THE HOPE WITHIN 47, 47–75 (Michael J. Murray
ed., William B. Eerdmans Publ’g Co. 1999). 
94. See generally WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN 
SCIENCE & THEOLOGY (2002).
95.  Consider, for example, what appear to be instances of fine-tuning:
1.	 If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as 
little as one part in 1060, the universe would have either quickly
collapsed back on itself, or expanded too rapidly for stars to form.  In 
either case, life would be impossible. . . .
2.	 [I]f the strong nuclear force, the force that binds protons and neutrons 
together in an atom, had been stronger or weaker by as little as five 
percent, life would be impossible.
3.	 [I]f gravity had been stronger or weaker by one part in 1040, then life-
sustaining stars like the sun could not exist. . . . mak[ing] life impossible.
4.	 If the neutron were not about 1.001 times the mass of the proton, all 
protons would have decayed into neutrons or all neutrons would have 
decayed into protons . . . mak[ing] life impossible.
5.	 If the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker, life would 
be impossible, for a variety of different reasons.
Collins, supra note 93, at 49 (footnotes omitted).  The intuitive force of this argument can 
be explained as follows (although this is not, strictly speaking, a premise in Robin Collins’s 
more sophisticated version): it is one thing to get lucky and win a lottery contest on some 
given day; it is another thing to get lucky and win ten lottery contests in a row.  The
intuition is that someone must have “cheated” to bring about that result.  For more on this,
see, for example, Himma, Design Arguments, supra note 78.
 96. Collins, supra note 93, at 53 (emphasis added). 
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It tells us only that the observation of fine-tuning provides one reason for 
favoring the hypothesis that God designed the universe over the hypothesis
that it has no designer or creator—and one that can be rebutted by other 
evidence. It is, in essence, grounded in nothing stronger than a principle 
that determines that some property of the universe is relevant with respect
to the issue of whether God exists; it provides, as Collins admits, only a
weak reason to think God exists and, by his own admission, fails as an
argument that could, by itself, show God exists.97 
The final argument here has few proponents in philosophy of religion
but likely remains the most controversial argument—namely, the “ID 
argument”—because of the increasing tendency among conservative
Christians to reject the theory of evolution as fully explaining the existence
of intelligent life.  The ID argument proceeds by distinguishing two relevant 
forms of complexity: a system or structure is cumulatively complex “if the
components of the system can be arranged sequentially so that the successive
removal of components never leads to the complete loss of function”;98 a 
system or structure is irreducibly complex “if it consists of several 
interrelated parts so that removing even one part completely destroys the 
system’s function.”99  Conceived as a system of the relevant type, a city is
cumulatively complex since one can successively remove people, services, 
and buildings without rendering it unable to perform its function.100  Likewise
conceived, a mousetrap, in contrast, is irreducibly complex because the 
removal of even one part results in complete loss of function.101 
The idea is that there are irreducibly complex systems in living organisms
that cannot develop through a gradual process like evolution:
An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced . . . by slight, successive
modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex
system . . . that is missing a part is by definition nonfunctional. . . .  Since natural
selection can only choose systems that are already working, then if a biological 
system cannot be produced gradually it would have to arise as an integrated unit, 
in one fell swoop, for natural selection to have anything to act on.102
 97. See id. at 54. 
98. DEMBSKI, supra note 94, at 147. 
99. See id.
 100. See id.
 101. See id.
 102. MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO
EVOLUTION 39 (1996). 
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Since, for example, a cilium-precursor (i.e. one that lacks at least one of a 
cilium’s parts) cannot perform a function that endows a cilium with adaptive 
value, organisms that have the cilium-precursor are no “fitter for survival” 
than they would have been without it.103  Since chance-driven evolutionary
processes would not select organisms with the precursor, intelligent design is
a better explanation than evolution, according to the ID argument, for the
existence of organisms with fully functional cilia.104 
This argument is problematic for a number of reasons.105  First, evolutionary
biologists have challenged the idea that there are, in fact, any irreducibly
complex systems found in nature,106 which, if correct, renders the distinction 
without relevant application to the case at hand; evolutionary biologists 
have explained how the eye, thought by ID theorists to be a paradigm
of irreducible complexity, can have evolved gradually in the way that neo-
Darwinianism suggests.107 Second, there is no reason to think that the
probability of evolving irreducibly complex systems is “vanishingly” small, 
as the matter is sometimes put.108  Having a non-functional precursor to a
functional irreducibly complex system does not necessarily render the 
organism less fit for survival; it might not improve the organism’s prospects,
but it does not necessarily diminish them.  Accordingly, having such a precursor
does not necessarily lower the probability of evolving an irreducibly
complex system.  Third, the claim that some existing thing has a feature, 
irreducibly complex or otherwise, that would be valuable to an intelligent 
being with certain properties does not imply anything about the probability
that such a being exists.  Finally, although design inferences are, in fact, 
utilized in science, they are utilized only in circumstances in which we
have sufficient antecedent reason to believe that intelligent agents with
the right kinds of ability to cause the relevant events already exist. An
anthropologist can infer from a bull-shaped stain of color on a cave that it 
was made by someone only because we already know that there existed
people at the time with the ability and motivations to paint pictures of bulls. 
103. See, e.g., Richard A. Wiedenheft, Evolution vs. Intelligent Design: Scientific Evidence 
that God Is in the Details, BIBLE SABBATH, Mar. 2005, at 4, 6, https://baonline.org/Issues/
Archives/BA-2005-2_March-Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KBS-4GT3]. 
104. See id.
105. For an extended discussion of the ID argument and its problems, see Kenneth
Einar Himma, The Application-Conditions for Design Inferences: Why the Design Arguments
Need the Help of Other Arguments for God’s Existence, 57 INT’L J. FOR PHIL. RELIGION 1, 
1–33 (2005).
106. Kenneth R. Miller, The Flagellum Unspun, in DEBATING DESIGN: FROM DARWIN TO
DNA 81, 87–88 (William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse eds., 2004). 
107. See Detlev Arednt, Evolution of Eyes and Photoreceptor Cell Types, 47 INT’L 
J. DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 563, 563–71 (2003). 
108. Ilya Prigogine et al., Thermodynamics of Evolution, 25 PHYSICS TODAY, Nov. 
1972, at 23, 23. 
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The design argument, however, cannot be used to show the existence of
something we do not already have antecedently adequate reason to believe
exists; design inferences do no more than distinguish things that are done
by intelligent beings from things that merely happen.  Not surprisingly, the 
design argument has very few proponents in philosophy or the sciences.
The verdict here—and this is likely one that would be shared by many 
theistic philosophers of religion—is that the arguments for God’s existence
simply fail to succeed in showing that God exists in at least one of two 
ways.  First, one could argue that the arguments all fail to provide evidence 
of God’s existence insofar as they rely on false premises or invalid inferences; 
false premises and invalid inferences are logically incapable of providing 
support for a conclusion.  Second, one could argue that the continuing
controversies among theist philosophers of religion as to whether these 
various arguments succeed suggest that the arguments, in their current
form, fail to convince a sufficient number of people to consider them 
successful in providing evidence that God exists.  Either way, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the arguments for God’s existence fail to
provide sufficient reason for that conclusion to warrant the protection of
a special right to religious freedom.
It should be noted that ordinary believers, stressing the importance of
faith as a moral virtue, are not likely to be troubled by this conclusion. 
The idea is that the faith of someone who believes without reasons in God 
is of greater moral worth than the faith of someone whose belief depends 
on reasons, as the faith of the latter is more likely to be transient than the 
faith of the former; as Kierkegaard stated the position, faith is valuable
because its object is “absurd” and insulated from the ordinary requirements
of rationality.109  This speaks not only to the lack of importance accorded 
to arguments and evidence, but also to a widespread sense among even 
theists that the arguments for God’s existence are unpersuasive.  Still, 
if there were such arguments, it is likely that Christians would look past 
the perceived moral defects of a faith grounded in reason and feature them
prominently in their proselytizing in the hope that a belief that begins in
reason would culminate in a faith and trust that does not depend on reason.110
 109. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAGMENTS 210 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 
1992).
110. In this connection, it is worth noting sociological evidence that shows that arguments
play little, if any, role in explaining why people are theists; a recent study in the sociology 
of religion shows that approximately 82% of adolescents with religious parents tend to be
 249
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While there are arguments against God’s existence—the most powerful 
and plausible being the argument that there is more suffering in the world
than an all-perfect God need allow to achieve God’s purposes—there is
no reason to consider them here.111  Insofar as it has been shown that the
arguments for God’s existence fail to provide sufficient reason to think 
that believers have an interest in religious freedom that can actually be 
threatened, that is enough to show that affording special protection to
religious worldviews cannot be justified on the strength of interests in
religious freedom that require protection because they can be threatened. 
Accordingly, religious freedom does not warrant, as a matter of political
morality, protection by a special right; as we have seen, we have no reason
to think religion has a distinguishing feature that implicates an important 
and unique interest that could be threatened by the behavior of states or
citizens.
Although this section explored only the evidentiary issues that arise in 
connection with classical theism, it seems plausible to think the same issues
would arise in connection with any religious view positing the existence 
of immaterial objects that cannot be adequately justified by scientific or 
philosophical argument. There are, of course, other traditions that do not 
hold that a personal God exists, instead holding that justice is administered
by some objective non-personal normative force—such as, for example, 
the doctrine of Karma.112  Although the argument of this section focused 
on the classically theistic tradition, it would apply as much to any religious 
worldview positing, as a core tenet of the view, the existence of immaterial
objects or forces that play a role in bringing about ultimate justice, as well
as any immaterial substances like souls.113 
as active and committed as their parents to the relevant religious views; in other words,
the probability that two Christian parents raise a child to have the same beliefs and
commitments that a parent has is about 82%.  See David Briggs, Parents No. 1 Influence 
Helping Teens Remain Religiously Active as Young Adults, ASS’N RELIGION DATA ARCHIVES
(Oct. 29, 2014), http://blogs.thearda.com/trend/featured/parents-no-1-influence-helping­
teens-remain-religiously-active-as-young-adults/ [https://perma.cc/WNX6-R5YF].  Arguments for
God’s existence are simply not relevant, as a sociological matter, in explaining a believer’s 
faith.
 111. See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Some Reasons to Believe that There Is No 
God, in WILLIAM LANE CRAIG & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, GOD?  A DEBATE BETWEEN
A CHRISTIAN AND AN ATHEIST 81, 83–98 (2004). 
112. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
113. Andrew Koppelman argues that there are a number of other interests to which
religious worldviews give rise that might warrant the protection of a special right to religion.
As he puts it: 
What else beyond salvation might be the good that religion supposedly delivers?
Multiple candidates suggest themselves, including harmony with the transcendent
origin of universal order (if it exists); courage in the face of heartbreak (if that
kind of encouragement helps); a transcendent underpinning for the resolution to 
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VII. AN EPISTEMIC SIMILARITY BETWEEN MORALITY AND RELIGION
The reader may have noticed that the most salient points I have made
about the epistemic difficulties involved in showing that a personal God
exists who subjects sinners to hell seem equally applicable to theories of
morality.  For example, whatever reasons support the view that moral 
principles are objective in character, which remains the most common
view among philosophers and laypersons, those reasons fall well short of
being characterized as persuasive.114  Likewise, whatever reasons there
are for thinking that moral principles are inter-subjective, conventional, 
or relative in character, they fall well short of being characterized as
persuasive.115  That is why there is a continuing controversy among moral
theorists and laypersons about the nature and character of morality. 
act morally (if that kind of underpinning helps); contact with the awesome and 
the indescribable (if awe is something you feel), and so on.  In the cottage industry
of proposals to discard the category of “religion” and substitute something else, 
however, these candidates haven’t gotten much attention, for the excellent reason
that they are theologically loaded.  It is not just that they are narrower and more 
specific than “religion;” it’s that their goodness is a specifically religious goodness
that depends on contestable metaphysical premises. 
Koppelman, supra note 4. There are a number of problems here.  First, Koppelman gives 
no reason to think that the other liberty rights of the Constitution do not already protect 
these interests adequately.  Second, as he points out, these are themselves religious doctrines
that assume the existence of something he describes as “transcendental,” which he admits 
is a theologically loaded doctrine.  The problem is that the very notion of the transcendental
presupposes the existence of immaterial forces or substances; as the Oxford Online Dictionary
defines the word, it means “relating to a spiritual or nonphysical realm.” See Transcendental, 
ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/
transcendental [https://perma.cc/9LZP-CGQ5] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).  As such, Koppelman’s 
candidate examples are vulnerable to the same objection being advanced in this section. 
There is, as was argued above, no epistemically adequate reason to think there is a realm
of the transcendental. Intriguingly, in the very same article, Koppelman expressly articulates 
in a number of places, including the quote above, the epistemic uncertainty about what he
characterizes as religious goods.  Here is one more example that sums up the problem that
is the topic of this section: “‘Religion’, then, is a proxy for the genuine religious good (if
there is one), and part of its value is that we need not agree about what exactly it is a proxy
for.” Koppleman, supra note 4 (emphasis added). It is precisely because we lack sufficient
reason to believe there is a God—and hence Koppleman’s qualification “if there is one”—
that it is morally illegitimate to discriminate against non-religious worldviews in favor of 
religious worldviews. Id. 
114. See supra note 86. 
115. These notions are all intended to express that morality is an artifact manufactured
by some group of people—usually thought to be a “culture.”  The idea is that whether
a moral principle is true or not is determined by what people in the culture generally accept
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One might be tempted to think, then, that the same conclusion applies,
so to speak, to a moral freedom analogous to religious freedom—namely,
that moral freedom does not warrant the protection of a special right.  After
all, if religious freedom does not warrant such protection in virtue of lacking
an adequate evidentiary foundation for the religion’s core claims, then
moral freedom, similarly lacking an adequate evidentiary foundation for 
the moral system’s core claims, does not warrant such protection. Thus, 
this counterargument might be expressed as follows: the arguments of this 
Article prove too much because they imply that people have no rights with 
respect to the freedom to act on their moral beliefs.
In one hyper-technical sense, I suppose this is true.  There is no special 
constitutional right that is expressly characterized as a right to “moral
freedom.”  Indeed, the very notion of a right to “moral freedom” seems
problematic in a number of respects—including, perhaps, a conceptual
difficulty in articulating the nature of morality that is analogous to the 
conceptual difficulty in articulating the nature of religion.  It would certainly
be odd to express a special constitutional right this way, if only because it
would be so unusual.
But the idea that this would imply moral freedom should not be protected 
by a special right of some kind is problematic.  First, assuming that the 
counterargument succeeds, it succeeds only in showing that we should not 
protect moral freedom with a special constitutional right to moral freedom. 
It would not succeed in showing that moral freedom does not necessarily
warrant protection of a constitutional right; it surely warrants protection 
as a derived right from other more general rights protecting autonomy,
conscience, belief, thought, speech, and association, which, I argue above, 
is also true of religious freedom. 
Second, and more importantly, ordinary psychologically healthy people 
cannot avoid having moral views that they take into account in deliberating 
about what they should do.  Indeed, moral considerations are deemed important 
enough that they are commonly thought to win in a conflict with purely
prudential considerations116—a somewhat remarkable, and civilizing fact
that conduces greatly to our being able to live together in peace.  If we
had to depend only on law to prevent people from trampling each other to 
achieve their prudential interests, it would not be long before society
would deteriorate into something resembling the mythical Hobbesian state 
or believe. Morality is hence, on this view, a social artifact that is determined by what
people believe or accept.  Thus, the truth-makers of such claims are not all mind-independent. 
116. See Frankena, supra note 39, at 691. 
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of nature—a coast-to-coast free-for-all in a nation that could not possibly 
afford a sufficient police presence to keep minimal peace.117 
Moral freedom, then, involves two features of moral salience missing 
from religious freedom.  First, only someone with a serious mental illness 
does not care about morality and acting in accordance with her beliefs.118 
One cannot be psychologically healthy without caring about ensuring that 
her behavior conform, as much as possible, with what she believes to be 
right; even people we consider “bad” attempt to rationalize their problematic 
acts as morally justified or excusable.  Neither agnosticism nor atheism 
can plausibly be considered a mental illness.  What distinguishes a religion 
from a morality is that one can lack the former, but not the latter, without 
being necessarily indicative of serious psychological illness.  Morality is 
distinct from religion in this theoretically salient respect.
Indeed, it is clear that we have strong intrinsically valuable interests 
protected by constitutional rights that would afford moral worldviews 
considerable legal protection. Clearly, we have an interest in being able 
to act autonomously that is both intrinsically valuable and of great importance. 
This interest in autonomy, which is the general capacity that is ultimately 
protected by all of the most common constitutional rights, implies interests in
freedom of thought, belief, conscience, association, and other activities.119 
Even if there are questions about the epistemic adequacy for accepting any
view about the nature or substance of morality, it is simply indisputable that
we have interests in acting according to our beliefs and conscience that
warrant the protection of constitutional rights.  There can be no question 
that limited “moral freedom” warrants the protection of constitutional rights.
Third, given that morality characteristically operates to constrain the 
pursuit of self-interest, it requires making sacrifices that conduce to the
good of other persons and hence increase the likelihood that people will 
avoid socially undesirable acts without needing a prudential disincentive 
in the form of a legal sanction.  While the moral views associated with 
any mainstream religious tradition will function to produce such benefits, 
117. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was an English philosopher best known today for 
his work on political philosophy and social contract theory.  See generally THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (arguing for a social contract and
rule by an absolute sovereign); see also Richard W. Alexander, The Myth of Power: 
Hobbes’s “Leviathan,” 70 J. ENG. & GERMANIC PHILOLOGY 31, 31 (1971). 
118. See, e.g., MARTHA STOUT, THE SOCIOPATH NEXT DOOR: THE RUTHLESS VERSUS
THE REST OF US 120–28 (2005). 
119. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). 
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this is not true of the descriptive claims that explain the nature of ultimate
reality.  The law requiring people to love their neighbors as they love 
themselves, if followed, conduces to social order, but the descriptive
belief that there exists a God with a triune character contributes nothing 
to do that—including nothing significant by way of inculcating a concern
for morality in a person.  While a particular set of descriptive doctrines might 
lead a person to adopt one moral principle instead of another, that person 
would, if psychologically healthy, come to adopt and care about moral
views that probably agree with mainstream secular views on a number
of core issues.120  Religious freedom offers nothing unique here in this regard.
Finally, the freedom to believe what seems morally right and to act,
within limits, on those beliefs form the very basis for the most fundamental
right that underlies nearly all existing specific constitutional rights—namely,
the right to autonomy.121 Legal recognition of the moral right to decide what
one values and to act, within limits, to achieve those values is the very
foundation of a free society.122  Insofar as a legal system can be legitimate
only if it recognizes certain basic freedoms, it must recognize and protect the
right to autonomy in some form.123  In most nations, this takes the form of
a number of specifically enumerated constitutional rights: free speech, privacy, 
physical security, free association, free thought, and, most importantly, 
conscience.124  While the right to autonomy is the moral foundation for
each of the specifically enumerated rights and should be considered
“fundamental” at the deepest level that incorporates moral concerns,
the aforementioned constitutional rights are properly characterized, from a
legal standpoint, as “fundamental” because not derived from other enumerated 
rights.125 
Accordingly, if morality shares some common characteristics with
religious views, these common characteristics do not imply either that moral 
freedom does not necessarily warrant legal protection or that the appropriate
legal protection does not take the form of a special constitutional right.
The rights to free speech, thought, and association, which, in effect, protect 
moral freedom, are fundamental constitutional rights and justifiably so.
There is nothing in the similarities between morality and religious views 
that would imply otherwise. 
120. For example, I know of no moral theory or tradition that does not include the 
principle that intentionally killing a person is presumptively wrong.  That presumption can 
be defeated, but that principle is universal to all known moral systems.  See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1980). 
121. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597. 
122. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408–09 (1986).
123. See id.
 124. See, e.g., 2012 J.O. (C 326) 391. 
125. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–98. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, I have argued that religious freedom does not warrant
protection by a special right that affords protections to religious
worldviews that are not afforded to non-religious worldviews by other 
constitutional rights.  In particular, I have argued that a special right to 
religious freedom can be justified only insofar as religion per se or various 
religious doctrines give rise to an interest distinct from the interests 
protected by the rights to free speech, association, press, belief, conscience, 
and other liberty rights that protect religious and non-religious worldviews 
alike. 
Although the argument is one of political morality, the foundation 
of the argument was grounded in epistemic considerations.  Insofar as a
special right to religious freedom would constrain the freedom of others, 
we must have adequate reason to believe, other things being equal, that
we have an interest in pursuing religious worldviews that we do not have 
in pursuing non-religious worldviews—and this epistemic requirement is
not met.  Protecting more elements of religious speech and freedom than 
non-religious speech and freedom is, thus, unjustified discrimination against 
non-religious worldviews. 
This is not to suggest that non-religious worldviews should be afforded 
more protections than religious worldviews.  On my view, they should
not, and nothing in the arguments of this Article implies otherwise.  The 
interests in having the freedom to pursue religious worldviews, expression, 
and activities are no less important, from the standpoint of political morality, 
than the freedom to pursue non-religious worldviews, expression, and
activities. The claim here is that the two types of worldview deserve equal
protection under the law. That is a claim that should seem, as an intuitive 
matter, eminently fair and plausible. 
Finally, nothing in this Article should be construed as hostile to religious
worldviews.  Although the centerpiece of the argument focused on the
epistemic difficulties in rationally justifying religious belief, there is nothing 
in the argument that implies that assent to religious worldviews should be 
withheld if those worldviews are not epistemically justified. Not every
claim one believes is of a type that either can or should be epistemically
justified; as I pointed out, the widely believed claim that morality is objective
is as lacking in persuasive argumentative support as the relevant religious 
doctrines are. Indeed, there is nothing in this Article that would imply even
that religious faith is not a virtue.  The thesis, again, is simply that the law 
should afford equal protection for religious and non-religious worldviews.
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In essence, then, the discussion in this Article can be summed up as 
follows.  This Article has argued that religious freedom warrants protection
by a derived right properly inferred from constitutional rights protecting 
free speech, thought, autonomy, conscience, and association—and not by 
a special right to religious freedom.  In order to justify protecting an interest
with a special right to X, other things being equal, three conditions must 
be satisfied: (1) the relevant interest must arise uniquely out of X; (2) the 
relevant interest must reach a certain level of value (i.e. must be sufficiently 
important); and (3) we must have some plausible reason to think that the 
relevant interest can actually be threatened by something in the world. I 
have considered a number of interests arising out of religion that might be
thought to justify such a right and have argued that they fail to do so.126 
126. Before closing, it is worth noting that the argument of this Article has one
important implication likely to be controversial. In particular, it implies that churches
should not be exempt from paying taxes. To exempt churches from paying taxes that every
other non-religious institution must pay, if the argument is sound, is to wrongly discriminate 
against non-religious worldviews.  Although the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment legitimately prohibits improper entanglement of the government with
religious institutions, the argument of this Article entails that taxing churches would not 
constitute improper entanglement with religion.
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